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FUTURE lNTERESTS-V ALIDITY OF SHIFTING EXECUTORY INTEREST ON EVENT 
CERTAIN To OccuR-Testator's will provided for alternative devises of his 
business real estate. If employees of the business exercised an option 
granted by the will to purchase his partnership interest within eight months 
after his death, the real estate was to pass to a bank in trust for his daughter 
and her children. If the option was not exercised within this period, 
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the real estate was to pass to his widow. A residuary clause divided the 
remainder of his estate equally between his widow, absolutely, and the 
named bank as trustee. After passage of the eight-month period, testator's 
daughter sought a declaration that she was owner in fee of the land in 
question. She asserted that, as testator's sole heir at law, the real estate 
passed to her as intestate property during the eight-month interim. Since 
performance of the conditions relating to the exercise of the option had 
been rendered impossible through actions by the widow, neither of the 
alternative devises in the will could take effect and title consequently 
remained in her absolutely. The probate department of the Circuit Court 
of Multnomah County rejected the daughter's contention and determined 
that title to the property had now vested in the widow. On appeal, held, 
affirmed. The land did not pass temporarily as intestate property, but 
passed under the residuary clause as a fee simple defeasible subject to 
alternative executory devises,1 one of which was certain to take effect at 
the end of the eight-month period. Title was to pass absolutely to the 
widow if for any reason the option was not exercised by the employees, 
even though one of the reasons was impossibility of performance.2 Estate 
of Palmer, (Ore. 1957) 315 P. (2d) 164. 
The real significance of the principal case3 appears to lie in the nature 
of the estate created by the devise of the land in dispute-a fee simple 
defeasible subject to alternative executory devises, one of which was 
certain to take effect within a computable period of time. There is a 
considerable body of authority to the effect that a grant or devise similar 
to that in question may not be construed so as to create an estate in fee 
simple that is certain to terminate at a given time.4 In support of this 
view there exists the notion that a fee simple must be potentially durable 
forever,11 and a limitation over that is inconsistent with this characteristic 
1 "An executory devise is, strictly, such a limitation of a future estate or interest in 
lands or chattels ... as the law admits, in the case of a will, though contrary to the 
rules of limitation in conveyances at common law. It is only an indulgence allowed to 
a man's last will and testament, where otherwise the words of the will would be void .••• " 
l FEARNE1 CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES, 10th ed., 386 (1844). 
2 The court further indicated that it would not permit the widow to take advantage 
of •her own wrong if she had deliberately prevented the employees from exercising the 
option. There was no showing to this effect, however. 
3 The court's conclusion that title was to vest in the widow if the option was not 
exercised for any reason, including impossibility of performance, was quite properly 
based on the testator's probable intention as construed from the language of the will. 
See 4 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., c. 60 (1956). 
4 I PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §14 and §46, comment i (1936). See generally Liesman v. 
Liesman, 331 Ill. 287, 162 N.E. 855 (1928); Stophlet v. Stophlet, 22 Ohio App. 327, 153 
N.E. 867 (1926); Ewering v. Ewering, 199 Ky. 450, 251 S.W. 645 (1923); Den v. Gifford, 9 
N.J. L. 46 (1827); Chudleigh's Case, I Co. Rep_. 113b, 76 Eng. Rep. 261 (1589-1595). See 
also Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 16a, 76 Eng. Rep. 664 (1587). 
5 "No estate is deemed a fee, unless it may continue forever." 1 PRESTON, AN ELEMEN-
TARY TREATISE ON ESTATES, 2d ed., 479 (1820). 
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in that it would terminate the fee on an event certain to occur must either 
be construed so as to avoid this inconsistency, 6 operate to reduce the fee to 
a lesser estate,7 or be declared void for repugnancy.8 This approach seems 
to be without justification. Holding in fee simple absolute, an owner 
should be permitted to dispose of his property in any manner consistent 
with existing rules of law and public policy, and the intention of the owner 
manifested in making such dispositions should be given effect to the fullest 
possible extent. The development of the law of executory interests has 
qualified the earlier concept of a fee simple through general recognition 
of the validity of an estate in fee simple subject to a springing executory 
interest on an event certain to occur.9 Thus it seems difficult to understand 
why there should be any objection to the creation of an estate in fee 
simple subject to a similar executory limitation of the shifting variety.10 
If an owner of property may retain a fee simple that will be cut off on the 
occurrence of the stated event on which a springing executory interest is 
certain to take effect, the owner should also be allowed to convey away a 
fee simple ·subject to a limitation certain to take effect in defeasance of 
the first taker's interest.11 This latter type of estate is in effect the 
type of estate construed by the Oregon court to have passed under 
testator's will in the principal case. In favor of recognition of estates of 
this nature is the fact that, in accordance with the owner's manifested 
6 See 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §549 (1956), and cases cited 
therein; 3 JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., c. 54 (1951). 
7 Liesman v. Liesman, note 4 supra (reducing preceding estate to an estate for life); 
1 PROPERTY RESTATEMNT §46, comment i, illus. 10 (1936) (reducing preceding estate to 
an estate for years). 
s See Den v. Gifford, note 4 supra. 
o An example of an estate in fee simple subject to a springing executory interest on 
an event certain to occur would be a conveyance by A, owning in fee simple absolute, to 
B and his heirs from and after two years from date. See 1 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §14 
and· §46, comment i (1936); 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §223 (1956); 
KALES, EsTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§464 to 466 (1920). See also Davies v. 
Speed, 2 Salk. 676, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692). 
10 See Ashby v. McKinlock, 271 Ill. 254, 111 N.E. 101 (1915), where a devise to 
testator's niece of the entire estate, with alternative limitations over on her death which 
exhausted all possibilities, was held to create a fee simple determinable subject to alterna-
tive executory devises, one of which was certain to vest on the death of the niece. But 
see Drager v. Mcintosh, 316 Ill. 460, 147 N.E. 433 (1925), and Liesman v. Liesman, note 
4 supra, noted in 23 ILL. L. REv. 713 (1929), reducing similar devises to life estates in 
the first taker. See also Trimble v. Fairbanks, 209 Ga. 741, 76 S.E. (2d) 16 (1953). 
11 See I SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §§223 and 502 (1956); 1 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY §4.56 (1952); Schnebly, "Limitations Over on the Death of a First 
Taker or on His Death Without Issue: Illinois Decisions," 7 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 587 (1940). 
It is indicated in I FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS. AND EXECUTORY DEVISES, 10th ed., 
398, n. (d) (1844), that the event on which an executory devise is to arise may be one 
certain to occur in cases where the devisor departs with the whole fee simple subject to 
a limitation over or where the deviser does not depart with the immediate fee. But 
see COLEMAN, AN EPITOME OF FEARNE ON CONTINGENT .REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY DEVISES 
78 (1878), to the effect that executory devises certain to take effect are restricted to cases 
where the deviser retains the immediate fee simple. 
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intention, the taker of the preceding estate will be granted the more 
extensive privileges of user that accompany ownership of an estate in fee 
simple.12 However, since the executory interest is certain to take effect 
in possession at the specified time, the holder of this future interest should 
be afforded adequate protection against waste in cases of extreme conduct 
by the preceding owner.13 In :in.ost jurisdictions the holder of the executory 
interest would also be protected against dower or curtesy claims by the 
surviving spouse of the first taker, such claims being divested along with 
the fee on the occurrence of the specified event.14 It is also undisputed 
that a conveyance by the owner of the preceding estate would not operate 
to prevent the executory interest from taking effect at the proper time.15 
Further, the absence of contingencies and uncertainties regarding the 
duration of the preceding estate and the vesting in possession of the future 
estate should serve to make both interests more readily marketable in. 
this respect.16 Thus recognition of the validity of this type of estate would 
not violate existing rules of law and would serve to advance general 
conceptions of public policy regarding ownership of property, while in 
no way precluding the holder of the future estate from the protection 
necessary to preserve his existing interest. Since the validity of this type 
of estate was not directly in issue,17 the principal case cannot be cited as 
controlling authority for the proposition that it is now possible to create 
an estate in fee simple defeasible subject to a shifting executory interest 
on an event certain to occur. Nevertheless, the principal case does serve 
to indicate the willingness of one court to give effect to such a devise when 
it was deemed necessary in order to carry out the testator's manifested 
intention. 
Jerome B. Li bin, S.Ed. 
12 See 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §191 (1950); 1 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §49 (1936). 
13 The holder of an executory interest limited to take effect on an uncertain event 
will ·be awarded injunctive relief in proper circumstances, but generally will be unable 
to recover damages for waste from the preceding owner. However, when the executory 
interest is certain to vest, it would seem that the ,bolder of such an interest should also 
be entitled to recover damages for waste, since the value of this type of interest can be 
readily ascertained. See 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §191 (1950); 5 id., §§642, 644 and 646 
(1956); 1 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §49 (1936); 2 id., §193. 
14 See 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §191 (1950); 1 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §54 (1936). 
15 The indestructibility of an executory interest has been established since Pells v. 
Brown, Cro. Jae. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). 
16 See Schnebly, "Limitations Over on the Death of a First Taker or on His Death 
Without Issue: Illinois Decisions," 7 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 587 at 589 (1940), to the effect 
that limitations of this type cannot be objected to on the ground that .they constitute 
restraints upon alienation. 
17 All parties to the dispute apparently assumed that the property passed in fee for 
the eight-month period. The issue presented was whether it passed under the will or 
as intestate property. It should be pointed out that had the court reduced the preceding 
estate to an estate for eight months, the ultimate outcome of this case would in no way 
have been affected. 
